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Multicultural Nations: Issues of Race and National Identity in Britain and Canada

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MULTICULTURAL NATIONS: ISSUES OF RACE AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN BRITAIN AND CANADA

by


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ABSTRACT

Nations remain the primary means of categorising people, despite talk of their demise in the globalised world. Taking as its premise that all nations are “imagined communities” (Anderson, 1991) this paper examines how two particular nation-states, Britain and Canada, have dealt with the challenges posed to their traditional national self-definitions by the increased influx of ethnoracial groups. Through key informant interviews with members of the state government in both countries and examination of the theoretical literature, this paper compares the means by which the state reimagines the nation, managing ethnoracial diversity to include or exclude these new members. This paper takes the position that fundamentally these two nations direct their nation-building project in a similar way, that at heart both nations retain their white cultural hegemony, various policies of multiculturalism existing as a means of controlling ethnoracial groups rather than creating a truly inclusionary framework.

Key words: Race; immigrants; nation; Britain; Canada
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“With blithe lightness of mind, we assumed that the world was moving irrevocably beyond nationalism, beyond tribalism, beyond the provincial confines of the identities inscribed in our passports, towards a global market culture that was to be our new home. In retrospect, we were whistling in the dark. The repressed has returned, and its name is nationalism.”

Despite prophesies of its demise in the globalised world the nation remains a primary means of categorising, defining and dividing people. Territorial boundaries define the physical space of the nation-state but nations are also an imagined place, defined by a shared history and culture. National identity is a way of defining who belongs and who does not, therefore immigration and national identity are closely intertwined, who is to be admitted and will fit into the nation and the ‘other’ who does not and who is to be excluded.

Increased movements of people challenge traditional definitions of national identity, of nations based on ethnic homogeneity created from a common language, culture and history. Through both creating ethnic diversity within state borders and creating transnational migrant networks and communities that transcend these national boundaries, immigration challenges narrow definitions of citizenship and identity (Castles & Miller, 2003; Schuster & Solomos, 2001).

This paper examines the response of the state to the challenges posed by migration to the nation and its role in reimagining the nation to include or exclude its new members. State governments use their ideological, juridical and repressive mechanisms, such as immigration and citizenship laws and discourse around issues of diversity and security, to establish and produce national and ethnic ideologies, imposing or resisting racial and ethnic divisions in society (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1993).

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1 Michael Ignatieff (1993) Blood and belonging: Journeys into the new nationalism
A comparative approach is used to examine the state’s role in reimagining the nation because different nation-states have responded to the challenges of diversity with policies following various versions of multiculturalism. Through comparing policies of different nation-states, it becomes possible to derive a more rounded understanding of the factors shaping the current understandings of ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘citizenship’ (Schuster & Solomos, 2001).

As subjects of comparative study, Britain and Canada share similar challenges to their national authority. These come both from above, from regionalism and globalisation and from below, from nationalism among indigenous minorities and the flow of immigrants (Castles & Miller, 2003). In the case of immigration, for both Britain and Canada, this has created a demographic reality of a multicultural and multiracial society, which has made their traditional definitions of their national identity as monocultural, white and Anglo-Saxon anachronistic. Therefore, both these states need to redefine their nations to include these ethnoracial groups, both in the sense of inclusion in the national definition, being seen as full members, as well as through having the full entitlements of citizenship, of full inclusion in social, economic and political terms.

In examining these issues, this paper first looks at how the nation is constructed and the role played by the state in this, before continuing to examine the specific issues and debates around race and nation in these two nation-states. Through evaluating both the theoretical literature and through qualitative interviews with those working within the state apparatus, this paper appraises the similarities and differences between these two particular nation-states. The aim of this to test the hypothesis that, fundamentally, these two nations manage their nation building projects in a similar way; that at heart both nations retain their white cultural hegemony,
with various policies of multiculturalism and community cohesion existing as a means for managing diversity rather than creating a truly inclusionary framework.
Literature Review

*Constructing the Nation: Theories of Race and Nation*

The terms ‘nation’ and ‘nationalism’ remain contested, in part because the subject area is so vast, encompassing the growth of nations and nation-states, ethnic identity and the sheer variety of national sentiments, aspirations and values (Smith, 2001; Hutchinson & Smith, 1994). Most theorists agree though, that nations and nation-states are social rather than ‘natural’ facts, one of the many constructions and inventions emanating from human choice rather than from nature or divine will (Hage, 1995; Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1993; Jackson & Penrose, 1993).

Benedict Anderson (1991) argues nations are “imagined communities” that exist only when a significant number of people in a community consider them to exist. This theory is based on the premise that “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the mind of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson, 1991, p 6). Nations are imagined as communities because they are always conceived of as deep, horizontal comradeships but communities with finite boundaries; beyond these boundaries lay other nations.

Anderson believes the development of nations lays in their cultural roots, a direct result of particular historical developments, in particular the development of printing. This popularized culture, so creating the possibility of a new form of imagined community to replace the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. Although ethno-symbolists, such as Anthony Smith (2001), also see nations as social constructions, they argue that the basis for the creation of the modern nation-state rests upon previous collective cultural identities in premodern epochs, in particular ethnic identities. These ethnic identities were connected to named human populations
associated with a particular territory, sharing myths of ancestry and historical memories as well as elements of a common culture.

Anthias & Yuval-Davis (1993) argue that while it is important to look at the historical specificity of the construction of collectivities, there is no inherent difference between ethnic and national collectivities; they are both Andersonian “imagined communities” and they are inherently linked. They point out that although there is virtually no place in the world where all citizens of the nation-state are members of the same national (“imagined”) collective, there is still an assumption of an overlap between the boundaries of the state citizen and the ‘nation’, between the boundaries of civil and political society. This is the result of the hegemony of one group, the “national aristocracies” in Hage’s (1995) term, which succeed in naturalizing their domination of the nation. These “national aristocracies” experience their national identity as a natural inheritance; they are national and behave nationally because they are born nationals as opposed to other groups who have to behave nationally to prove they are nationals. The hegemony of this group and its access to the ideological apparatus of the state and society allows it to maintain this mythical connection between the nation-state and ethnic collectivity.

The concept of the nation-state therefore becomes the primary space for the articulation of racist ideology as it both embodies the idea of race and legitimises it through the granting or withholding of citizenship. Through the creation of the ‘other’, an (often racialised) outsider who is perceived to have negative threatening qualities, a dialectic of inclusion-exclusion is created that is used to define national boundaries, characteristics and identities (Comeau & Allahar, 2001; Jackson & Penrose, 1993; Ignatieff, 1993). For those resident in the nation-state who are not members of the dominant national collectivity, this means construction as deviants
from the ‘normal’ and exclusion from important power resources (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1993).

The forms of nationalism on which nation-states are built are commonly divided into civic, based in terms of common citizenship, and ethnic, based on common ethnicity. Most Western democratic nation-states, such as Canada and Britain, identify themselves as civic nations, defining their nationhood in terms of common citizenship rather than common ethnicity. This second type of ethnic nationalism is perceived as problematic and responsible for practices of intolerance in Eastern Europe and parts of the Third World. Despite these self-perceptions, examples of white ethnic nationalism in these Western nations, similar to those in some countries in Europe, show the revolt against the idea of a nation based on citizenship rather than ethnicity (Smith, 2001; Hage, 1995; Ignatieff, 1993).

Hage (1995) argues that in reality the structure of both civic and ethnic nationalism are the same, seeing in the concentration of otherness a counter-will to be dealt with in the process of nation building through either domestication or extermination. He argues that motherland building, creating the ordered and pleasing imaginary space of homely belonging, practices the domestication of otherness, shaping and positioning it so it can service the needs of the domesticator. Fatherland building, creating the imaginary space of governmental and sovereign belonging, transforming the nation into a collective subject with its place in the international symbolic order, monitors and exterminates any potential counter-will to the nation. This counter-will is any element that is beyond its control, with a will of its own being, that weakens the national body being built or aims to organise it differently, therefore transforming it. He argues that all nations contain both motherland and fatherland building; therefore, all are capable of both domesticating and exterminating (both physically and symbolically) otherness. Every
governmental act also has a residual act of extermination in it: only by eradicating its capacity to
form a counter-will can national otherness be domesticated and turned a functional object within
the motherland. Therefore, every act of domestication and valorisation is also an act of
eradication of the other as an independent will. The different actions taken by states result from
their socio-historical context, their stage in the process of nation-building and the relation of
power between nation-builders and their ‘others’, rather than a difference in the form of
nationalism (Hage, 1995).

**Comparative Studies: Britain and Canada**

Each nation-state deals differently with the challenges brought by the immigration of
ethnic ‘others’ depending on their stage in the process of nation-building and the relations of
power within it. Nations that have developed into states are less anxious about their being and so
are more likely to emphasize domestication and valorisation over extermination of otherness
(Hage, 1995). In the developed Western world, many states have followed various versions of
multiculturalism to deal with large numbers of different ethnic groups that have entered their
nation-states. Some theorists suggesting this is one of the means by which states keeps
ethnoracial groups in a dependent position, entrenching their second-class status and so
managing their challenge to the dominant group (Li, 2003; Bannerji, 2000; Henry & Tator, 2006;
1999; Kallen, 1982).

In each country, the forms of multiculturalism vary according to the history of
immigration, race-relations and patterns of minority incorporation. Through comparing the
means by which minorities are included in the nation, it becomes possible to gain a more
rounded understanding of factors shaping the concepts of ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘citizenship’ (Schuster & Solomos, 2001).

In his critique of British theorists, in particular those from the Black Cultural Studies school of thought, Andrew Favell (2001) made clear some of the problems inherent in studies of issues in a single nation context. Advancing conceptual innovations and theories untested in other national contexts means theorists are unable to provide generalisable theory, so their ideas become solely applicable to that specific context. Ignorance of other societies and selective understanding of only a few can also lead to mistaken perceptions, which he argues in the British case limits the ability of theorists to speak effectively about even British race-relations (Favell, 2001).

Despite the benefits of comparative research, very few comparisons of issues of immigration and race relations in Britain and Canada exist (Kymlicka, 2003; Smith, 1993; Reitz, 1998). The majority of studies examine only one or other of these nations (e.g. Sales, 2005; Li, 2003; Back et al, 2002; Benjamin, 2002). When comparisons do occur, they often consist of only a couple of pages, so not allowing for an in-depth analysis (Henry & Tator, 2006; Abbas, 2005; Bannerji, 2000).

Of the few comparative studies of these issues, two are dated, their analysis ending in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Smith, 1993; Reitz, 1988), meaning they are unable to address developments that have occurred since. For example, Smith’s argument that the British immigration debate focuses on control and exclusion became outdated in 2000 with New Labour’s recognition of the dependency of the economy on immigration (Sales, 2005; Back et al, 2002). As both Smith’s and Reitz’s analysis occurred before the terrorist attacks in the USA in 2001, Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, they cannot address the current preoccupation with
security and fear of the transnational ties of first and second generation immigrants within state borders (Gilroy, 2006; Sivanandan, 2006).

In a more current study, Will Kymlicka (2003) undertook an examination of citizenship reforms in Britain, reflecting on the links between immigration, citizenship and the accommodation of ethnocultural diversity in Britain and Canada, in an attempt to illuminate the reasons why citizenship oaths, ceremonies and language tests, seen as perfectly acceptable in the Canadian context provoked such strong reactions in Britain. As a study based on theory rather than empirical research, it is possible to question his equal depth of knowledge of both cases. For example, unlike several prominent British writers (Sivanandan, 2006; Burnett, 2004; Back et al, 2002), Kymlicka does not perceive the citizenship reforms in Britain as a form of assimilation, seeing them as moderate and pragmatic. He argues that the New Labour government is attempting to develop a consensus on immigration and living with diversity. Further comparative study, in particular empirically based research, could answer the validity of his comparison.

Although the means by which the British and Canadian state deals with issues of race have not frequently been subjects of comparative study, there has been much debate among theorists within each national context. This is the focus of the following sections.

**Debates of Race and Nation in Britain and Canada**

Both Britain and Canada promote their ethnic diversity as a quality making their country unique, this diversity a source of national pride. The Department of Canadian Heritage claims: “Canada’s experience with diversity distinguishes it from most other countries. Its 32 million inhabitants reflect a cultural, ethnic and linguistic makeup found nowhere else on earth” (Canadian Heritage
The ethnic diversity of Britain was marketed as a reason why London should hold the 2012 Olympic Games, Mayor Ken Livingstone commenting: “In choosing to highlight London’s diversity as a major reason for backing our bid, Nelson Mandela has shown a strong understanding of why London, a global city, should host the world’s greatest sporting occasion” (BBC, 5 April 2005).

Government in both countries claims to value and celebrate this diversity, working towards a peaceful and integrated society. In Canada, immigrants from “all parts of the globe continue to choose Canada, drawn by its quality of life and its reputation as an open, peaceful and caring society that welcomes newcomers and values diversity” (Canadian Heritage, n.d.). In Britain, the Home Office claims a “vision of a racially integrated society that recognises and celebrates strength in its diversity”, which it works towards by building “a safe, just and tolerant society for everyone in the UK, regardless of their race, religion, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, disability or age” (Home Office, n.d.).

Despite government claims of creating an inclusive society, many theorists suggest these countries retain their white cultural hegemony, systemic racism marginalising and excluding ethnoracial groups (Henry & Tator, 2006; 1999; Back et al, 2003; Li, 2003; Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1993). This exclusion occurs because of the racism embedded in the structures, the norms and goals and processes of the social, cultural, political and economic institutions of society. The intersection of these institutions reinforces racism through cohesiveness of their ideologies, discourses and written and unwritten policies and practices. In examining institutional racism in the police force in Britain the Macpherson Report drew on various sources to create a definition for their use; one source they found useful was a definition by Dr Benjamin Bowling:

Institutional racism is the process by which people from ethnic minorities are systematically discriminated against by a range of public and private bodies. If the result
or outcome of established laws, customs or practices is racially discriminatory, then institutional racism can be said to have occurred. Although racism is rooted in widely shared attitudes, values and beliefs, discrimination can occur irrespective of the intent of the individuals who carry out the activities of the institution. Thus policing can be discriminatory without this being acknowledged or recognised, and in the face of official policies geared to removal of discrimination. However, some discrimination practices are the product of uncritical rather than unconscious racism. That is, practices with a racist outcome are not engaged in without the actor's knowledge; rather, the actor has failed to consider the consequences of his or her actions for people from ethnic minorities.

Institutional racism affects the routine ways in which ethnic minorities are treated in their capacity as employees, witnesses, victims, suspects and members of the general public (Macpherson Report, 1999. Para. 6.33)

State ideology, discourse and practices therefore play an important role in creating inclusion and exclusion from the nation. Of particular importance are policy and practices around immigration and race relations. Immigration policy defines who is eligible for entry and who is worthy of full membership through citizenship; the debate around these issues attaches significance and social meaning to immigrants and ethnic diversity (Castles & Miller, 2003; Solomos, 2003; Reitz, 1998; Smith 1993).

Race relations and anti-discrimination policy are often a direct product of the discourse around immigration, as highlighted by Reitz’s (1998) comparison of Britain and Canada. He argues that the effect of immigration policy on issues of race relations in these two countries directly affected the ways in which equal rights were addressed. He believes that the highly institutionalized immigration controls in Canada, intended to preserve the traditional rights of immigrants already in Canada, meant that the Canadian population had little to fear from immigration, resulting only in muted undercurrents against immigrants. In Britain on the other hand, initially at least an appearance of being non-discriminatory had to be maintained in order to preserve traditional relationships with the Commonwealth, resulting in outbreaks of racial hatred. Immigration therefore brought issues of race relations to the forefront of British politics, affecting the ways in which they addressed equal rights. He believes that the lack of comparable
immigration-race controversy hampered equality legislation in Canada, the absence of a race issue used to argue that equity legislation was unnecessary (Reitz, 1998).

Historically Britain and Canada followed different immigration policies and different methods of managing diversity; yet despite these differences, theoretical debates in both nation-states follow a similar pattern, questioning policies that maintain systemic racism, maintain the dominant cultural hegemony and marginalize ethnoracial groups. The debates in each national context are examined in turn.

**Race and Immigration in Canada**

Canada defines itself as an immigrant receiving country, celebrating this identity as a nation of immigrants. Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper vocalised the main tenets that underpin the Canadian identity when he stated:

> Canada is a nation of immigrants who have built a country that is strong, united, independent and free. A country that provides equal opportunity for all, a country that values and respects the rich cultural traditions of all our peoples, and a country that treats everyone as full-fledged members of our diverse Canadian family (Harper, 2007).

This identity rests on the premise that immigration policy selects immigrants for their skills and education regardless of their racial background (Smith, 1993); the resulting diversity managed through a multiculturalism policy and programmes that value all as members of the Canadian ‘mosaic’. Canada is very proud of the fact that it was the first country in the world to institute such a policy, this policy seen to benefit all in society:

> Multiculturalism ensures that all citizens can keep their identities, can take pride in their ancestry and have a sense of belonging. Acceptance gives Canadians a feeling of security and self-confidence, making them more open to, and accepting of, diverse cultures. The Canadian experience has shown that multiculturalism encourages racial and ethnic harmony and cross-cultural understanding, and discourages ghettoization, hatred, discrimination and violence (Canadian Heritage, n.d.).
Will Kymlicka (1998) echoes this positive sentiment about the merits of multiculturalism, perceiving it overall as a great success for Canada. Kymlicka devoted much of the first part of his book *Finding Our Way* (1998) to responding to critiques of multiculturalism by Bissoondath (1994) and Gwyn (1995). They argued that multiculturalism inhibits integration, promotes ethnic separatism, threatening Canadian values, individual rights and freedoms, and leads to a society torn by divisions. In response, he argues that immigrant groups have integrated far quicker and more effectively than before the adoption of the multiculturalism policy. To support this thesis, he argues that immigrants are both politically and socially integrated, citing naturalisation rates increasing since 1971, nearly proportional numbers of Members of Parliament to percentage of population occurring in the political system, as well as high percentages of official language acquisition, decreasing rates of endogamy and lack of permanent ethnic enclaves. In the case of black Canadians, he believes that the immigrant multiculturalism model is working to integrate these groups, that the general integrationist model is not limited to ‘white’ ethnic groups. Those who argue otherwise, he believes are being premature and are unconsciously adopting American assumptions about race relations.

Kymlicka’s definition of multiculturalism makes clear the intention underlying multiculturalism is the integration of ethnoracial groups, arguing multiculturalism is not a rejection of integration but rather a vehicle for adjusting the terms of integration:

multiculturalism is best understood as a response by ethnocultural groups to the demands that the state imposes on them in its efforts to promote integration. From this perspective, the first step towards understanding multiculturalism is to understand the pressures – both positive (incentives) and negative (barriers) – that the state exerts in order to persuade immigrants to integrate into Canadian society (1998, p25)

The British theorist Parekh (2005) suggests that integration, although seeming benign and even sensible in aiming to bring in immigrants from the margins of society, giving them the
same rights as everyone else, is not as innocent as it first appears. He suggests integration involves not only inclusion and equality but also a particular way of integrating or incorporating outsiders into the prevailing social structure that differs only slightly from assimilation. The particular form of pluralist integration advocated by multiculturalists, although respecting and accommodating differences and allowing immigrants to integrate in their own different ways, still remains committed to full integration. Diversity is allowed only in the manner of integration not the result, uneasiness with all forms of self-chosen separation remaining.

Theorists in Canada, particularly those using a race-based analysis, argue that the state uses multiculturalism to manage diversity and the claims made by other groups in the nation, while maintaining the cultural hegemony of the dominant group (Li, 2003; Bannerji, 2000; Henry & Tator, 2006; 1999). Henry and Tator suggest the ideology of multiculturalism provides a veneer for a liberal pluralist discourse, so that Canada can continue to pride itself on its values of individualism and tolerance without altering the core of the common dominant culture.

In making a distinction between the public and private spheres of the nation, Kallen (1982) argues that multiculturalism effectively preserves Porter’s (1965) “vertical mosaic” of ethnic inequality, clearly entrenching second-class status to ethnocultural groups and maintaining the public sector as an Anglo or French cultural monolith. The public space remains dominated by the charter groups, whose collective linguistic rights are recognised and guaranteed in public life and whose cultural norms remain entrenched in public institutions; ethnocultural groups’ collective rights are reduced to a symbolic celebration of past ethnic heritage in the private space. In order to attain social positions within public institutions, it becomes necessary to assimilate into prevailing Anglo or Franco norms and practices.
Neo-Marxist anti-racists suggest that the racism in Canadian society is historically inscribed, part of the interplay of the history of culture, race and power. Having constructed, perpetuated and used the identities of the ‘others’ to its advantage, the dominant culture is therefore reluctant to discard them, as this would mean abandoning the way in which inequalities and imbalances are legitimised (Henry & Tator, 2006; 1999; Bolaria & Li, 1988). Programmes such as multiculturalism and anti-discrimination laws are the means by which the state prevents this racism from undermining its legitimacy while maintaining the ethnic stratification in society. Through state funding of ethnocultural organisations, ethnocultural groups are kept in a dependent position, with divisions created between them; ethnoracial groups seeing what divides them in terms of culture, rather than what they have in common as part of the struggle against racism (Sivanandan, 2006; Bannerji, 2000). Bannerji suggests the state finds it easier to tolerate cultural nationalism or religious fundamentalism than a class-based movement among immigrants.

Henry & Tator (2006) and Li (2003) argue that despite Canada’s commitment to the principles of equality and non-discrimination, race remains embedded in Canadian institutions, racial differences articulated in the normative order, public discourse and economic relations. They refer to this contradiction between a commitment to liberal values and the attitudes and behaviours that lead to intolerance and discrimination as “democratic racism”. “New racism” or “democratic racism” stresses the oblique and covert nature of racism, as distinct from its conventional blatant manifestation

Democratic racism becomes particularly apparent in the discourse around immigration, “diversity” and Canadian identity. This discourse uses a codified language that appears benign on the surface but carries racial subtexts, therefore allowing the articulation of racial messages
without making a direct reference to race, so enabling the conduct of a racist discourse without
seeming contradiction in a liberal democratic society. Within this discourse, the nation is
declared as homogenous and white, ethnocultural groups constructed as a threat to the national
culture. Through concerns about issues of Canadian identity, national unity and multiculturality
issues of race are articulated; the new ‘diversity’ is perceived to have produced social stresses
and tensions that undermine the social cohesion of the country. (Henry and Tator 2006; Li,
2003).

The result of this racism embedded in Canadian institutions and society is social
exclusion for ethnoracial groups. Through a number of working papers, the Laidlaw Foundation
examined issues of social exclusion, linking poverty and economic vulnerability to other sources
of exclusion such as racism, disability, rejection of difference and historic oppression (Gilbert,
2003). For immigrants and ethnoracial groups, this systemic racism has denied them full access
to the social, economic, political and cultural systems that determine the social integration of a
person in society. The resulting social exclusion leads to a denial of their civil, political and
social rights of citizenship. The consequences of this for ethnoracial groups are a lack of
recognition and acceptance, feelings of powerlessness, economic vulnerability, diminished life
experiences and limited life prospects (Omidvar & Richmond, 2005; Saloojee, 2003).

This discrimination is particularly apparent in the labour market, leading to blocked
opportunities, including lack of access to more highly valued employment, employment
segregation, income differentials, higher rates of unemployment and poverty (Teelucksingh &
Galabuzi, 2005; Li, 2003). Teelucksingh and Galabuzi pointed out the important repercussion of
this for social inclusion, commenting that: “racial discrimination continues to be a major factor
in the distribution of opportunities in the Canadian labour market and by extension in
determining the life chances of racialised peoples and immigrants in Canada” (Teelucksingh & Galabuzi, 2005, p4).

The notion of social inclusion has become an important framework for addressing issues of systemic racism, poverty and exclusion. The position of the Laidlaw Foundation is that dealing with these issues needs more than just an examination of the facts of exclusion and has to move away from the conventional concern about bringing the ‘outsider’ in, instead questioning into what the marginalised are being brought, by questioning the dominant centre. Instead of a rights-based approach to dealing with issues of exclusion, they instead advocate for an approach based on social inclusion and valued recognition. Social inclusion is about changing what is at the centre; about closing the physical, social and economic distances separating people and creating the conditions whereby all members of society are able to participate as valued, respected and contributing members of society. Social inclusion necessitates investment and action to bring about the conditions for inclusion, validation and recognition of diversity, rather than just the removal of barriers through rights-based approaches to discrimination (Omidvar & Richmond, 2005; Saloojee, 2003; Gilbert, 2003).

Other theorists, such as Henry & Tator (2006), Li (2003) and Bolaria & Li (1988) agree that a rights-based approach to discrimination is flawed, pointing out that the systemic racism in Canadian institutions and society renders anti-discrimination policies ineffective as instruments of social change. They argue that the ways in which legislation, such as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Employment Equity Act, is implemented and interpreted is affected by the racism embedded in the collective values, beliefs and normative system of Canadian society. In addition, by individualising the problems of racism rather than tackling its structural aspect, institutions, such as the Human Rights Commission, remain ineffective as instruments of social
change. They argue that the problem is that Canada’s conflicting values render it unable to deal with the systemic racism at its heart. The state intervention necessary to bring changes in the existing social, economic and political order to ameliorate the low-status of ethnoracial groups is perceived as in conflict with and a threat to liberal democracy. State attempts to deal with racism therefore leave basic economic structures and societal relations unchanged, consequently failing to address the deep-rooted systematic nature of racism.

The importance of the neoliberal philosophy underpinning the Canadian state in creating this systemic racism is emphasised by a number of theorists, including, Li (2003) and Abu-Laban & Gabriel (2002). This is apparent within the multiculturalism programme, with its increasing focus on promoting community initiatives and self-help rather than funding all ethnocultural organisations. Neoliberal goals are also at the heart of state immigration policy, focusing on using immigration to bolster the Canadian economy, both in importing the necessary skills and capital and by using diversity as the means of selling the nation on the international stage (Li, 2003, Abu-Laban & Gabriel, 2002). Abu-Laban & Gabriel suggest that multiculturalism in its new guise of selling diversity on the international stage represents a new vision of nation building in Canada. Increasingly, multiculturalism is attached to the trade, economics and globalisation discourse, perceived as a tool for enhancing Canada’s global competitiveness.

Simmons (1998) argues that this pre-eminence given to neoliberal economic goals in Canada’s immigration strategy has led to “neo-racism”. Neo-racist immigration policies arise when the broader discourse on nation-building gives a high priority to other objectives, leading national leaders to deny or ignore racist influences and outcomes. In Canada’s case, immigration policy initiatives are promoted by the state as complements to general efforts to increase Canada’s economic competitiveness and attract foreign investors by means such as reducing
public expenditure. Policy therefore aims to attract highly skilled, wealthy, entrepreneurial immigrants, while at the same time ‘downsizing’ public institutions and spending. The neo-liberal ideology and the related future image of the nation dominates the political discourse while the policy outcomes resulting in increased ethnic competition for jobs and wider income disparities that affect in particular non-white groups are ignored.

Therefore, in Canada, despite the state’s apparent attempts to promote equality, tackle issues of discrimination and create inclusion, many theorists argue the nation remains primarily as it always has, dominated by the white, Anglo-Saxon, Christian majority; diversity merely the means by which this majority uses the ethnoracial minorities to its economic benefit. The next section examines the debates in Britain, looking at the similarities and differences in the discussion of these issues in that context.

**Race and Immigration in Britain**

In Britain, immigration policy took a different path to that in Canada, affecting the discourse and race relations policies that followed (Reitz, 1998). Despite the different tracks their immigration policies have followed, Henry and Tator (2006) argue that Britain is a paradigm for Canadian society, with a similar but earlier pattern of immigration from the Commonwealth and similarities in the patterns of bias and discrimination faced by ethnoracial groups.

Similarities between the two nations are apparent in the discourse around migration, with the term ‘immigrant’ linked in both countries to ethnoracial immigrants and this immigration constructed as a threat to the nation defined as homogenous and white. In Britain during the 1950s and 1960s, following immigration from the New Commonwealth, debates examined the impact of immigration on housing, the welfare state and on the ‘racial character of the British
people’ and their national identity. These debates reinforced a racialised construction of Britishness and inextricably linked question of immigration to black immigration from the Caribbean, Asia and Africa (Solomos, 2003; Rex, 1995). During the 1980s and 1990s, the Conservative governments affirmed the ‘naturalness’ of British values, British culture and British family life, and constructed ethnoracial communities as a threat to this cultural, political and religious homogeneity. Government discourse also constructed ethnoracial groups as a danger to the social fabric and political stability of the nation, with inner cities portrayed as ‘black enclaves’ where British law and order was not easily enforced, and black youth as social time bombs (Solomos, 2003; Gilroy, 1991).

With the ending of primary immigration from the Commonwealth, the new immigrant threat came instead from asylum-seekers. Sivanandan coined the phrase xeno-racism to describe the new racism sweeping Britain, Europe and the Western world. This new racism uses the racist traditions of demonisation and exclusion to keep out asylum-seekers on the grounds of being ‘bogus’, ‘illegal immigrants’ and ‘economic migrants’ come to ‘scrounge’ on the wealth of the West, threatening their national cultures. Where this racism differs from its previous incarnation is that it is no longer colour coded, instead applying to poor migrants whatever their cultural or racial background; in today’s world Sivanandan argues, “poverty is the new black” (Sivanandan, 2006; 2005; 2001 p2; Feteke, 2001).

The government response to the influx of ethnoracial immigrants and the backlash against them has been to follow various strategies of anti-immigration and anti-discrimination legislation on one hand, with various programmes of assimilation, integration and multiculturalism on the other. During the 1960s, a two-pronged approach balanced strict immigration controls with measures to prevent discriminatory practices. The notion of
integration became linked to the idea that unless political institutions helped deal with the social problems of immigrants, such as discrimination, social adjustment and welfare, and helped educate the public about race relations, then there was a real danger of US style racial conflict developing (Solomos, 2003). The 1981 Scarman Inquiry into the Brixton Riots identified the underlying problem as individual prejudice and ethnic disadvantage rather than institutional racism and recommended specific programmes to combat this disadvantage. From this grew state-funded multiculturalism, which funded a wide variety of ethnic and religious groups and projects (Sivanandan, 2006). The underlying premise throughout the various stages was that all immigrant groups would assimilate into the national culture (Abbas, 2005; Solomos, 2003).

The change to a Labour government in 1997 seemed to promise a break away from the policies that marginalised ethnoracial groups and towards an honest effort to deal with issues of systemic racism. The Macpherson Report into the handling of the murder of Stephen Lawrence\(^2\) brought issues of systemic and institutional racism to the fore, New Labour including some of the recommendations of this report into the 2000 Race Relations (Amendment) Act. Importantly, this brought the police force, implicated in systemic racism, under the remit of the Race Relations Act for the first time (Solomos, 2003; Back et al, 2002).

Under New Labour, government discourse moved away from the reification of white national culture under the Conservatives towards a celebration of a multicultural and diverse Britain, national imagery being connected to an increasingly multicultural environment. One such example of this was Home Secretary Robin Cook’s comment about Chicken Tikka Masala

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\(^2\) On 22\textsuperscript{nd} April 1993, two black teenagers, Stephen Lawrence and Duwayne Brooks were attacked by a white gang, resulting in Stephen’s death. Following an outcry from the black community following a lacklustre police inquiry, a public inquiry was established under Sir William Macpherson, which found London’s police force institutionally racist.
being Britain’s true national dish, not only because of its popularity, but because “it is the perfect illustration of the way Britain absorbs and adapts external influences” (Solomos, 2003 p220).

Many theorists in Britain point out that if New Labour’s first term in office celebrated multicultural diversity, its second term moved Britain towards an assimilationist model (Abbas, 2005; Burnett, 2004; Back et al, 2002). The turning point came in 2001, with the ‘race riots’ in the north of England and the terrorist attacks on the US, after which Asian youth became problematised and criminalised in popular and state discourse (Sivanandan, 2006; Fekete, 2004; Back et al, 2002).

Whereas the primary focus of urban disorder in the 1980 and 1990s had been on the centrality of Caribbean young men, the new focus was on the participation of young Asian men (Shukra et al, 2004). This situation worsened after the 2005 London bombings, an event interpreted by some as evidence that at least some British Muslims had loyalties beyond the British state to a worldwide Islamic network whose interests might be at odds with those of Britain. These perceptions raised the spectre of dangerous, unassimilated ‘others’ in the public mind and created further alienation of racialised groups (CRE, 2005). Abbas (2005) argues that in the post-September 11, 2001 climate, British Muslims are at the centre of questions of what it means to be British or English. Sivanandan (2006) agrees with this, arguing that the War on Asylum and the War on Terror have converged, combining the characteristics of an asylum seeker and terrorist. This new racism “Cannot tell a settler from an immigrant, an immigrant from an asylum seeker, an asylum seeker from a Muslim, a Muslim from a terrorist. We are, all of us, Black and Asian, at first sight terrorists or illegals” (Sivanandan, 2006, p2).

These two events hardened criticism of multiculturalism, a policy already seen by many from both sides of the political spectrum as problematic (Shukra et al, 2004). From the political
left, criticism of multiculturalism came from David Goodhart (2004) who argued that Britain had become too diverse to maintain a welfare state, that there needed to be more integration through greater acceptance of shared national values and history to maintain the underpinning willingness of all to fund a universal system. Trevor Phillips, from the Commission for Racial Equality, saw multicultural politics as divisive and a failure in integrating ethnic minority communities, arguing that Britain was “sleeping walking to segregation”. Anti-racists, such as Sivanandan (2006) criticised it for concentrating on celebrating difference and doing too little in confronting issues of racial violence and systemic discrimination. For the authors of the Burnage Report3 in 1989, multiculturalism in the form of moral anti-racism and token policies gave the impression that much was being done for minority communities at the expense of white children so producing a backlash (Shukra et al, 2004).

Following the ‘race riots’ and the terrorist attacks, the British state steered race relations policy away from multiculturalism and towards ‘community cohesion’, creating measures aimed at fostering social and community cohesion. The Department of Communities and Local Government claims policies such as community cohesion “help communities fulfil their potential and overcome their own difficulties including community conflict, extremism, deprivation and disadvantage” (Communities and Local Government, n.d.). Indeed, the policy of ‘community cohesion’ seems innocuous enough, aiming to achieve equality between different races and to develop “a better sense of community cohesion by helping people from different backgrounds to have a stronger sense of ‘togetherness’”. The Department of Communities and Local Government describes a cohesive community as one where:

> there is a common vision and sense of belonging for all communities; the diversity of people’s different backgrounds and circumstances is appreciated and positively valued; those from different backgrounds have similar life opportunities; strong and positive

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3 This report formed part of an investigation into the 1986 schoolyard murder of an Asian boy by a white peer.
relationships are being developed between people from different backgrounds in the workplace, in school and within neighbourhoods (Communities and Local Government, n.d.).

This rhetoric of social cohesion reflects the concerns voiced in the Cantle Report into the disturbances of the summer 2001, but the government’s proposals and policies neither addressed the racism that ignited the riots in Bradford, Burnley or Oldham, nor the social deprivation experienced by ethnoracial communities in these areas (Shukra et al, 2004).

A number of theorists, particularly anti-racists like Sivanandan (2006) and Feteke (2004), argue that community cohesion and the corresponding citizenship policies are assimilationist, promoting homogenisation and monoculturalism. The notion of social inclusion forms the heart of much of this policy formulation, affected through ‘education for citizenship’ and ‘citizenship ceremonies’ with the onus on immigrants to conform to what are claimed to represent core British values. Shukra et al (2004) point out the terms integration, inclusion and exclusion through deployment across various policy discourses, such as education, poverty, health etc., become normalised and acquire the status of common senses. Therefore, it is presented as obvious that those who settle in Britain should respect and embrace ‘our values’ and seek to share ‘our sense of belonging and identity’.

The policy of social and community cohesion is linked to New Labour’s notion of citizenship, a cohesive Britain requiring that its citizens share a value base and actively participate in the electoral process. The expectation is for all ethnocultural groups to speak English at home, to become active citizens, to build on ‘shared aims’ across ethnic groups, to focus less on differences and avoid ‘extremism’. This policy is problematic because community-driven compromises, settlements and ideas are encouraged only if they fall within the defined framework; community funding made conditional on accepting a form of governance that
establishes and maintains a community identity and value system in line with Home Office views. Embedded in this strategy is an assumption that certain communities do not share a sense of common civic pride and duty. Rather than the state having an obligation to cater for all its citizens, the obligation instead becomes contingent upon the reworking and realignment of individual identities and value systems (Burnett, 2004; Shukra et al 2004).

A number of theorists have drawn attention to the contradiction inherent in the debate of immigration, citizenship and race in Britain. The introduction of the Human Rights Act blurred the distinction between the rights of citizens and non-citizens, making it harder to deport undesirable foreigners, while the introduction of ID cards forms a closer link between citizenship and entitlement. With immigration policy, New Labour’s is caught in the predicament of both wanting neo-liberal economic growth based on the rhetoric of globalised economic forces, while attempting to protect the social integrity of the nation-state. The government both acknowledges the dependence of the British economy on immigrant labour and attempts to rectify chronic labour shortages through the Highly Skilled Migrants Programme, while remaining unwilling to open the immigration debate because of the legacy of racism and hostility to issues of immigration (Goodhart, 2006; Back et al, 2002). Instead, the government has returned to the rhetoric of the 1960s, with its commitment to value diversity balanced with strict controls placed on the movements of migrants and refugees to protect against racism (Abbas, 2005; Back et al, 2002; Sales, 2001), this policy made apparent in the White Paper “Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration and Diversity in Modern Britain”:

To enable integration to take place and to value the diversity it brings, we need to be secure within our sense of belonging and identity and therefore be able to reach out and to embrace those who come to the UK…Having a clear and workable and robust nationality and asylum system is the prerequisite to building the security and trust that is needed. Without it, we cannot defeat those who would seek to stir up hate, intolerance and prejudice. (quoted in Back et al, 2002).
This contradiction in policy is due to the paradox that animates the politics of race and racism in Britain, the government looking forward into an era of neo-liberal economic globalisation and European integration, while still caught in the past with the remnants of a racially exclusive nationalism and phantoms of imperial greatness. Britain seems caught in what Gilroy (2005) terms as “postcolonial melancholia”. Despite New Labour’s gestures towards cultural diversity and inclusion, “its body politic beats to the rhythm of a white heart”; the New Labour government “is so difficult to characterise because its vision oscillates to the past and future by turns. It cannot mourn its imperial ghosts, nor embrace a democratic and truly multicultural future” (Back et al, 2002 para. 5.7).

The literature in both Britain and Canada therefore makes clear that both nations still struggle with including ethnoracial groups; these groups are still perceived as minorities to be protected or pacified within state-borders, or indeed following the terrorist attacks, as potential fifth columnists themselves posing a threat to the nation. The racism at the heart of state institutions is of particular concern to theorists writing about issues of race and nation, as these institutions and the policy and discourse stemming from them structure the process of discrimination in society, leading to social and economic exclusion and therefore to a lesser form of citizenship within the nation.
Methodology

The debates discussed above in the literature in both Britain and Canada formed the framework for the questions put to both government and political officials in Britain and Canada. The aim of this was to compare how members of government perceived diversity and the means by which inclusion was promoted, both in the sense of the national identity and in breaking down the barriers to inclusive citizenship.

As a study examining a social system, the creation of national identity, comparative research is both appropriate and useful. Comparison of how different nations are including ethnoracial groups makes apparent what is common across societies and what is unique. The discovery of aspects that are general across cultures rather than specific only to one allows new and alternative explanations for causal relations to emerge (Neuman, 2006). As Favell (2001) made clear, advancing concepts and theories untested in other national contexts makes creating generalisable theory impossible, these concepts and theories being then tied to the specific context in which they were theorised. Comparative study is also beneficial in that it reveals potential hidden biases, assumptions and values implicit in society, so allowing for a better understanding of each individual case being studied (Neuman, 2006).

As people create and define the social world through human interaction, both their perceptions and responses to events are therefore affected by the subjective sense of their experiences. The researcher consequently affects and influences the research in the sense that who the researcher is both affects the subject’s perception and responses to questions as well as the researcher’s analysis of the data (Neuman, 2006). Therefore, it is important to situate the researcher within the body of research. As a study predominately about race, the fact I am white is important. My whiteness makes me a member of the dominant cultural group in both nations,
my white privilege affecting my perceptions, in that although I am able to empathize, I do not know what it is like to be on the receiving end of racial discrimination. My race also affects perceptions of me by interview subjects. This latter fact was an important factor in deciding to conduct key informant interviews with government officials rather than with ethnoracial groups, who may feel uncomfortable speaking to me about racism.

As a study evaluating state policy, key informants from within government, both politicians and bureaucrats, were selected for interview. Semi-structured interviews explored what these informants believed their level of government perceived as the issues of diversity, the policies implemented to tackle institutional racism and foster belonging and inclusion, as well as their perceptions of what the concepts of “Britishness” and “Canadianess” meant. The interview guide can be found in Appendix I. Specific questions did not examine the “War on Terror” and its effect on certain ethnoracial groups. Although recognising the importance of this, it was not a primary focus of this paper. Instead, general questions examining issues faced by ethnoracial groups and perceptions of how well multiculturalism was working looked at this issue in an indirect manner, making it possible to see how important the key informants regarded the “War on Terror” and the resulting backlash against the Muslim community by how often it was mentioned and the significance attributed to it.

As an exploratory study, the sample used was small, consisting of four key informant interviews in the UK and five in Canada. As each level of government has its own responsibilities, key informants from each level of government were invited to participate. As far as possible comparable subjects were selected but as the structure of government in these two nations differs, Canada having a federal structure, whilst Britain a unitary structure (please see Appendix II), making exact matches was difficult. Therefore, rather than trying to find exact
comparable matches, each level of government (local, regional, national) was represented in the sample.

Although face-to-face interviews are the most useful for gaining good quality qualitative interviews, issues of time, distance and financial restraint meant face-to-face interviewing was not always possible, necessitating the occasional use of telephone interviewing. In order for participants to feel comfortable answering potentially controversial questions and to protect them from any repercussions, all identifying information, apart from the area of government in which they work, has been removed and pseudonyms used.

Qualitative analysis identified themes in the information provided in the interviews. The reliability and validity of this data was checked against government produced documentation, reports, speeches and press releases.

Subject Sources

In Britain, the Department of Communities and Local Government was invited to participate as a representative of the Central Government. This department’s mandate is to create prosperous, economically vibrant, attractive and cohesive communities through helping them fulfil their potential and overcome their own difficulties including community conflict, extremism, deprivation and disadvantage (Department of Communities and Local Government, n.d.). Unfortunately, it was not possible to meet with someone representing this department, caused in part I believe, by the timing of the attempted bombings in London and Glasgow, making the Central Government less willing to comment on issues of multiculturalism. Instead, a member of the Commission on Integration and Social Cohesion was interviewed. The Department for Communities and Local Government appointed the Commission in August 2006
to examine how communities could be empowered to improve cohesion and tackle extremism (Department of Communities and Local Government, 2006). After an extensive consultation process across the country, the Commission released its final report, *Our Shared Future*, on 14th of June 2007 (Commission on Integration and Cohesion, 2007).

In Canada, the Department for Canadian Heritage was selected as a representative of the federal government, as this department has responsibilities for the federal government’s multiculturalism programme. The mission of this department is to create a more cohesive and creative Canada in which Canadians express and share their diverse cultural experiences with each other and the world. Their other strategic outcome is to create an inclusive society built on intercultural understanding and citizenship participation (Department for Canadian Heritage, n.d.).

Once below the national level of government it was necessary to narrow the regional focus, time constraints did not allow interviews to take place in every province/country in these two nations. In the UK, England was the focus; this country containing the majority (4,459,470) of the total UK population (4,635,296) listed as ethnic minorities, (National Statistics, 2001 Census). Unlike the other countries making up the UK, England does not have a separate parliament, governed instead directly from the British Parliament in Westminster. Therefore, the next level of government below Central Government is the regional assemblies. Of these, the most powerful and the most relevant in terms of the number of ethnoracial minorities living within its boundaries is the Greater London Authority. Nearly half (45%) of the UK’s non-white population live in the London region, where they comprised 29% of all residents (National Statistics, 2001 Census).
In Canada, Ontario became the regional focus, as Ontario is home to 2,200,000 people identifying themselves as visible minorities. Over half (54%) of all those identifying themselves as visible minorities in Canada live in Ontario, where they comprised 19.1% of the province’s population (Ontario Ministry of Finance, 2001 census). Unfortunately, nobody from the Ministry of Immigration and Citizenship in Ontario was able to meet with me; instead a representative from the business immigration section of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade was selected for interview. Although this interviewee was able to give the provincial government perspective, there was inevitably an emphasis on the economics of migration due to the ministerial department in which this person worked.

At the local level of government, both a London and a Metropolitan Council in the Midlands were selected for interviews. In London, Haringey was selected because of its demographic diversity, with just under half (48.94%) of Haringey’s communities coming from ethnocultural minority groups. Residents from non-white communities made up 34.4% of Haringey’s residents (National Statistics, 2001 Census). Haringey also faces issues of poverty, necessitating the implementation of policies to deal with issues of deprivation and integration. In the government’s 2004 Indices of Multiple Deprivation “Extent of Deprivation Scale”, Haringey was listed the tenth most deprived local authority in England (National Statistics, 2001), while also being issued beacon status recognizing its achievements in ‘Getting Closer to Communities’ (Haringey Council, 2005).

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4 According to Statistics Canada, the concept of visible minority applies to persons who are identified according to the Employment Equity Act as being non-Caucasian in race or non-white in colour.
5 The beacon scheme is an annual award scheme run for local government by the Improvement and Development Agency and the Department for Communities and Local Government to recognize achievements and spread best practice in public service delivery. The idea of disseminating and sharing good practice is at the heart of the scheme with the intention that authorities can learn from each other and deliver high quality service to all. Each year ten themes are developed by Ministers and the beacon advisory panel in consultation with local government cutting across the spectrum of service delivery and reflecting areas of concern of policy development (The Beacon Scheme, n.d; Tower Hamlets Borough Council, n.d)
To obtain a more rounded picture of issues in Britain, the focus was moved further north, to Birmingham Metropolitan Council. After London, the largest population of non-white communities reside in the West Midlands (13%). The largest urban centre in the West Midlands is Birmingham, which is home to 289,681 people who defined themselves as from an ethnic group other than white, making up 29.6% of the city population (National Statistics, 2001 Census; Birmingham city council, n.d.). Birmingham, like London, has also been the sight of ethnic tensions, of so-called ‘race-riots’, the most recent taking place in 2005 around the Lozells Road (Observer, 2005).

At the local government level in Canada, the City of Toronto seemed a logical choice as a subject source, as the home to both a large number of immigrants, with 49% of its population born outside of Canada, and a large number of individuals defining themselves as visible minorities (43%) (City of Toronto, n.d). Interview subjects in Toronto consisted of two members of the city government and a councillor for a ward containing both a large number of first generation immigrants and a number of ethnoracial groups (City of Toronto ward profiles, n.d.).

Using qualitative analysis, themes reoccurring throughout the nine interviews were identified, these findings discussed in the following section.
Interview Findings

The interviews suggest that Britain and Canada share many similarities in how they are dealing with becoming multicultural and multiracial societies. As the sample used in this research was a small and therefore not representative, only tentative conclusions can be drawn from these interviews. However, certain trends across the interviews suggest a number of similarities. The interviews suggest that both nations were keen to celebrate their multiculturalism and identify it as an important part of their national identity, while at the same time recognizing that ethnoracial groups were marginalized within the nation-state; ethnoracial groups still facing substantial issues of economic, cultural and social exclusion that kept them from enjoying the full rights of citizenship.

Diversity as a valued commodity

The notion of diversity adding value to the nation, particularly in the economic and cultural sense, was prominent in interviews in both nations, making apparent the neo-liberal concerns underpinning these nation-states. Abu-Laban & Gabriel’s (2002) suggestion that the Canadian government was selling diversity and multiculturalism on the international stage as the means of enhancing Canada’s global competitiveness, could equally be applied to the British context. Like Toronto, London claims to be one of the most multicultural cities in the world, and Gail, from the Great London Authority (GLA) made clear the importance of marketing the city’s diversity, in particular the significant role this played in London’s successful bid for the 2012 Olympic Games:

…many people agreed that was the main reason that we obviously won the bid and how prominent it is that we actually hold onto that and really show that when we actually deliver the games (Gail, GLA).
Culturally, diversity brought a vibrancy to urban centres, customs, clothing and particularly food and festivals emphasised as bringing vitality to the major cities in Britain and Canada. In Britain, the term “richness” was used several times to describe what this diversity had added to the British culture. This cosmopolitan vitality both brought interest for the local population as well as being visible expressions of the ethnocultural diversities in London and Toronto, both of which are keen to market themselves as a “world city”, this term used in interviews in both cities.

The marketability of the knowledge, skills and contacts of a diverse population received a great deal of emphasis in Canada; this mentioned by virtually every respondent at all levels of government, surprisingly receiving little comment in Britain. Examples of this can be seen in comments made on this subject by Rathika from the City of Toronto and Julie from the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade at the provincial level of government:

…it sets out an ability for the city and the country to interact better in global markets in terms of selling products, in terms of professionals…. if firms are endeavouring to compete in various foreign markets it is useful for them to be able to have staff locally who are familiar with the culture and history and the places where people might want to do business (Rathika, City of Toronto).

…many of the immigrant communities that have come are actually using their homeland ties, making those connections, and helping. So globalization has sort of flattened the way business is being done and allowed the opportunity for people to do business across borders and so multiculturalism has facilitated that, or diversity has facilitated that. Because of our diverse population, Canada has looked beyond the States as an economic partner and has looked internationally (Julie, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade).

**National Identity**

In examining questions of “Britishness” and “Canadianess”, there was recognition of how diversity had affected and changed the national identity and indeed even become part of it. At
the same time, it was apparent that at least segments of the population still saw this diversity as separate and apart from an identity based on core values, seen as belonging only to the traditional white members of the nation.

The change brought to the Canadian and British identity through the impact of immigration, received comment from a number of interview subjects, John from the City of Toronto and Robert from the Commission on Integration and Cohesion most clearly articulated this:

Toronto changed tremendously from the 1950s to today and a big factor in this was the Italian and Portuguese waves of immigration after the war so we reinvented who we were... and that is to me why multiculturalism works here, because we allow people to remember who they are….People remember who they are and it has changed who we are and that’s a good thing as well (John, City of Toronto).

…the interruption of a cultural outlook, the set of cultural values that were global in reach, if you like, brought the empire back home, in ways that were frequently disturbing but also in ways began to transform British culture. So British culture was transformed by migration as much as those migrants were transformed by being in Britain and as part and parcel of that process there is complex history about forms of racism, forms of racist violence, forms of rejection and division….these forms of conflicts are pretty grim and extremely difficult but in the balance I think, have actually, if you like, revivified the ways in which people think about what it is to be British, what it is to have a particular history that this country does have (Robert, Commission on Integration and Cohesion).

A few of the interview subjects believed that diversity had an even stronger impact, making multiculturalism a defining factor of the national identity. In Canada in particular, the notion of being a nation of immigrants and embracing multiculturalism as part of the national identity received great emphasis, comments from Stuart at Heritage Canada and John from the City of Toronto illustrating this:

…part of what being Canadian is, in fact multiculturalism, or a pluralistic and diverse society and everyone living together in a certain amount of harmony (Stuart, Heritage Canada).
…in Canada we’re a country, we are truly a country of immigrants unless you’re native…the discussion as I see it in Canada is about how, for the most part, about how we succeed together (John, City of Toronto).

In Britain, although multicultural diversity was recognised as affecting British identity, only one interview subject suggested the notion of multiculturalism as an integral part of the British identity. Gail from the GLA commented:

…we have had surveys recently in the country which for example the favourite British dish is curry, you know, it is very clear that the whole multiculturalism agenda is really at the heart of what people define as being British now, which is a good thing (Gail, GLA).

Much of the discussion in Britain took place around the multiplicity and plurality of identities held by people in Britain, both new immigrants and the British born who often had loyalty to one of the composite nations making up the United Kingdom as well as to Britain. Robert from the Commission on Integration and Cohesion argued that although attachment to the nation state was important and “gives you one sense of Britishness” it was important to recognise the plurality of identities in today’s world:

…the ways in which people exist now is within a much more plural, Babushka doll like structure of forms of sentiment and attachment, to the very local, the neighbourhood, the local district level, the regional, city level, the national but also to the transnational, the continental, the global. So, I think we have pluralized forms of attachment, of which I wouldn’t want to demean or diminish the enduring power of the nation state or to a sense of Britishness but what I think we need to do is to contextualize it alongside the fact that in the UK, most of the polling data shows that people identify much more strongly at the local level than at the national level, like across all groups and ethnicities (Robert, Commission on Integration and Cohesion).

Gail from the GLA and Diane in Birmingham both commented on the fact that the British identity is flexible enough that people are able to hold other identities alongside this one. They discussed how people in Britain often have affiliations to countries where they, their parents or grandparents came from, that many people in Britain identify with more than one country, whether it is Scotland, Ireland or Poland. The recognition that people may have connections to
other places while maintaining their roots and their loyalty to Britain, the ability to hold a plurality of identities was an important reason why Britain did not follow an assimilationist model like the United States (US):

…the American culture is a very strong, patriotic American, and, they certainly all unite as an American, as a nation of Americans, against or together against any other sort of force or anything, whereas I don’t think we have that, and I think that has a lot to do with the fact that we are Great Britain and there are four countries within that, and I think people tend to define themselves as Scottish or Irish for example before they would say British (Gail, GLA).

Interestingly, in another comparison made between Britain and the US, Grant from Haringey argued that Britain should be more like the US, arguing, “Immigrant’s affinity should be to the country where they live, where they make their living and their children go to school”. He argued that although migrants should hold onto their identity, they should also be part of society and not outside of it, “so as in the US, they must be American first and their own culture second” (Grant, Haringey Council).

Unsurprisingly, British and Canadian identity was also defined through core liberal values of democracy, rule of law and human rights. As Ignatieff (1993) has pointed out, many Western nations perceive their nations as based on political and civic ideals, emphasising the political rather than the ethnic basis of their nationalism, ethnic nationalism seen as the product of less developed Third World nations. At the federal level, Stuart from Heritage Canada commented that the Secretary of State has spoken a lot about “Canadian identity and core Canadian values of things like democracy, rule of law, human rights”, believing that this “is part of what it means to be Canadian”. At the municipal level, John described a Canadian as:

Somebody with the shared values of peace, order and good government, who believes in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, who at his or her core has a sense of social justice and lives in a place that is bloody cold in the winter (John, City of Toronto).
The fact that certain sections of society perceive these ‘core values’ as separate from diversity, a product of and owned only by the dominant culture is made apparent by the following comments from interviews in both Britain and Canada:

I sometimes find in the media, that the media then tries to play on that is somewhat different from multiculturalism but I don’t see that. I see that multiculturalism actually fits very well into that and part of what being Canadian is, is in fact multiculturalism or a pluralistic and diverse society and everyone living together in a certain amount of harmony, so I don’t see then that as being as being exclusive of each other (Stuart, Heritage Canada).

That there might be core values that inform us of rights and responsibilities at the national level that correlate closely with a sense of Britishness that is legitimate and proper but that the notion that they would be exclusively British is potentially slightly worrying I think (Robert, Commission on Integration and Cohesion).

Integration

Despite the celebration of multiculturalism and talk of the benefits of diversity in the interviews, there was a recognition that ethnic and racial diversity remains predominantly an urban phenomenon and in reality contained mainly in the major cities of their respective countries.

Graham from Toronto commented that outside of the 905 area was Orange⁶, white Canada, Canada remaining “a pretty white country”. At the provincial government, Julie commented on the differences between Ontario and other parts of Canada:

…definitely where we are at in Ontario, in terms of how we see diversity is different from how in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick they see diversity, its still pretty much white, middle class British western Europe, Northern Europe. And so that is evolving. Canada is truly not an entirely multicultural nation, it is really pocketed in certain areas (Julie, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade).

Stuart particularly emphasised the urban-rural split, commenting, “you really are looking at two different sorts of Canada”. Although the availability of services and established family or communities are important reasons for this, Stuart did comment that rural communities needed to

⁶ By which he mean Orangemen, referring to the majority of the population being protestants.
be ready and welcoming to ethnoracial groups. Some movement has begun in that direction, Julie pointing out that some of the rural communities were trying to work out ways to attract new people, through tax advantages, through housing, through making clear business opportunities, but as Stuart pointed out, “there is still some work to be done in that area” (Stuart, Heritage Canada). In Britain, as well, ethnoracial groups have clustered in the cities. Diane from Birmingham commenting that some places in the UK have remained untouched by any form of immigration.

Significant differences between the major cities in both the diversity they contain and integration between groups was recognised. Both Toronto and London were recognised as different from other metropolises in their countries because of the sheer variety of different groups. Rathika in Toronto commented on the domination of certain cultures in other Canadian cities, such as in Vancouver where Asian Chinese, South East Asian and South Asian dominate. In Britain, both Grant and Robert mentioned the difference between the northern cities, predominately dominated by two groups, white British and Asians, who live separate from one another. This is seen as very different from London, where the sheer diversity of different cultures made it difficult not to mix. In both London and Toronto, this mixing of cultures was seen as creating greater understanding and tolerance between different groups, as made apparent by these comments from Gail and Graham:

Londoners are all over the city and there is a real demonstration that people are living side by side in relative harmony” (Gail, GLA)

…person to person, there is more tolerance in Toronto than anywhere else in North America (Graham, City of Toronto Councillor)
In examining the spatiality of diversity and levels of tolerance and intermixing between groups, Robert emphasised the importance of examining the particular histories and geographies of areas as they affected the different processes of racialisation:

…in the north of England, where you have fairly, one particularly strongly determined strand of migration that ties to south Asia and a particular political economy that has gone bust with the whole deindustrialization, you will get a particular sort of entrenched process of racialisation between old white communities and 1960s migrant minorities and that gives you a very different cartography of multiculturalism, than something you would find in say the London Borough of Newham where you may have eighty-seven different migrant streams at different times through the last sixty years tied to seventy different economic bases that have been growing, strengthening, weakening, collapsing in plural cycles in London’s more complex economic landscape…what that means is that the nature of the multicultural is massively different from where you have something that is slightly more post industrial, ossified, less dynamic in other parts of the country, so those histories inevitably are inscribed in the landscapes of the place (Robert, Commission on Integration and Cohesion).

Despite the fact that there is less obvious polarisation between white and ethnoracial groups and between different groups in London, both interview subjects in this city made clear that there were intercommunity tensions below the surface. With both the white British-born population and older groups of immigrants, including the British-born black and Asian populations in London and Birmingham, there were resentments against newcomers, who were perceived as placing pressures on local services and taking jobs and benefits away from current residents.

In the case of the white population, this resentment is made apparent by the increasing popularity of the right-wing British National Party, which focuses on an anti-immigration, right-for-whites stand, made abundantly clear by this excerpt from their manifesto:

Not only is Britain increasingly overcrowded, but the fact is the country is the product of its people and if you change the people you inevitably change the nature of the country. We want Britain to remain, or return to – the way it has traditionally been. We accept that Britain always will have ethnic minorities and have no problem with this as long as they remain minorities and neither change nor seek to change the fundamental culture and identity of the indigenous peoples of the British Isles (BNP, n.d).
This party remains a small minority, but its increased representation on London councils is certainly of concern to the GLA, Gail anticipating that its representation on local councils will spread to other parts of London.

Interethnic tensions are also an issue of concern in both Birmingham and London. Grant mentioned particular issues between the longer-resident black community and the newer Turkish community in Haringey, which recently spilled over into violence with a stabbing at a local technical college. In Birmingham, Diane discussed the outbreak of violence between young Asian men and Afro-Caribbean British black men in the Perrybar area of the city in 2005, commenting that:

There continues to be tensions throughout the city, these tensions caused by older groups resenting newcomers. In particular, the problem is newcomers being moved to areas without many support services and the lack of understanding of these new communities. In other parts of the city community relations works well and there are low levels of crime but there are five or six areas of the city, which we feel, are quite vulnerable (Diane, Birmingham City Council).

In Toronto, issues of intercommunity tensions were less of an issue with emphasis placed instead on communities retreating into themselves and forming ethno-specific ghettos, isolating themselves both from the dominant culture and from each other. In particular, because of the large numbers of different ethnocultural and ethnoracial groups, building relationships between these groups was seen as important. As John pointed out:

I do think that we need to ensure that people don’t end up living in enclaves with people who are similar to them. That is something that happens in places of poverty and places of affluence. We see that within and around Toronto and that is something that I think we need to fight against very much (John, City of Toronto).

Due to the current climate of fear created by the “War on Terror” and the terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid and London, it was not a great surprise that the Muslim community in both countries faced issues of discrimination. This was less of an issue in the
Canadian interviews than in the British, perhaps in part because there had been a successful attack on London in 2005 and several attempts again over the summer period when the interviews were taking place. In both countries, the media played an important part in creating a connection between security issues and ethnoracial diversity, in particular focusing on the Muslim community as illustrated by the following comments:

…there have been community tensions issues, you know, particularly in relation to the Muslim community which I think the media have been huge in, you know, conduit in terms of exacerbating the whole situation as well. (Gail, GLA)

…there is a real connection in the media in many cases between that (security issues) and multiculturalism, between multiculturalism policies and between that and specific ethnocultural, ethnoracial groups I don’t think that is the way that we see it or that most people see it in terms of that. That connection isn’t necessarily there and certainly there are challenges that you know need to be addressed, but that connection is a bit of a false connection in some ways (Scott, Heritage Canada).

**Exclusion**

Throughout the interviews in both countries, discrimination against ethnoracial communities and the social exclusion that this leads to was recognised. As discussed in the literature, this discrimination against ethnoracial groups leads to the denial of access to the social, economic, political and cultural systems of society, marginalising them to the fringes of the nation, denying them the civil, political and social rights of citizenship. Therefore, despite claims of valuing and recognising diversity as a fundamental and integral part of the nation, this discrimination and exclusion still marginalises ethnoracial groups into a lesser form of citizenship (Omidvar & Richmond, 2005; Saloojee, 2003).

Ethnoracial communities suffered similar issues of discrimination and exclusion in both countries. These included underachievement in the educational system, health problems, over-representation in the criminal justice system and issues of gang violence. Graham, a Toronto
city councillor, believed this was due to structural racism leading to exclusion and blocked avenues for advancement, stating: “young people in particular see a bleak future and so turn against society. They are excluded from society, so why would they want to participate in it?”

Much of the discussion around issues of exclusion centred on issues of integration into the workforce; at the municipal level the emphasis was on how other forms of exclusion followed on from problems with this:

…with that comes your ability to participate in society because if you are busy scrambling in low paid jobs, two or three low jobs, it has an impact on your children, on your ability to participate in society at large, your ability to enjoy the cultural and other kinds of benefits that are in the city, and cost of housing, where you live, journey to work, it is really around their economic situation, because from that stems all sorts of other issues (Rathika, City of Toronto).

At the federal and provincial levels of government, issues of economic integration concentrated more on the economic productivity of migrants and less on the resulting issues of social exclusion, again making clear the neoliberal values in government policy and discourse. Both these levels of government focused specifically on migrants coming through the points system and on issues faced by these skilled immigrants in labour market integration, particularly the difficulty of finding positions in their field and having their foreign credentials recognised.

…on the down side, obviously, recent reports about foreign trained immigrants, that have come particularly to Ontario, not being able to find jobs, particularly in their field are a really important issue that we haven’t really been totally successful in integrating our new immigrants whether it is economically… or politically in terms of political activism and political participation (Julie, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade).

A neoliberal concern with the productivity of immigrants becomes particularly apparent in Julie’s comment about skilled immigrants finding positions in their field:

…even if they are not finding a position in their field, they are still finding employment. So really, at the end of the day, we feel that those who have come with high education levels have an ability to transfer their skills in other areas (Julie, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade).
Although not mentioned to the same extent as in Canada, the economic fortunes of migrants were also of concern in Britain. Interestingly, like in Canada, the focus was on particular streams of immigrants, in this case on refugees and migrants from the new accession countries to the European Union, in particular those from Poland. Although refugees coming from all parts of the globe may face issues of racism, Eastern Europeans are predominantly white. These immigrants therefore face discrimination and racialisation based on their migrant status, their economic class and their ethnicity. These white migrants come to fill an economic role previously filled by ethnoracial migrants from the New Commonwealth in the post 1940s period, and face similar issues of recognition and integration to those earlier groups of migrants:

With the 1990s migration you have in many ways a rerun of some of the same issues, huge labour demand being satisfied by migrant minority communities, that have to struggle for their existence when they get here, have to fight forms of racism and exclusion, they have to fight for their rights, have to fight for the recognition of their contribution to British society and the British economy and there is a much earlier stage in all that where there’s some pretty poisonous talk about migration, refugees and diversity (Robert, Commission on Integration and Social Cohesion).

The interviews suggest that despite recognition of the benefits of ethnocultural and ethnoracial diversity, ethnoracial groups within state borders remain contained in urban areas, facing issues of discrimination and blocked access to the goods and benefits of society. The members of the government interviewed recognised this discrimination and indeed policies have been implemented to both encourage intermixing and ‘cohesion’ between communities and to tackle issues of discrimination.
**Government Policy**

In both countries, interview subjects clearly defined issues of institutional racism and the promotion of community cohesion as the key aims of the legislation and policies implemented by their governments. In Britain, the Race Relations (Amendment) Act is the main piece of legislation aimed at dealing with issues of institutional racism within state institutions; all those interviewed underlined the importance of this Act. For example, Robert commented:

…you’ve seen forms of progressive policy intervention, and the Race Relations Amendment Act would be one massively important example of that (Robert, Commission for Inclusion and Social Cohesion).

This Act legislates that all public bodies must produce Race Equality Schemes that set out how they are going to meet their duties to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination, promote equality of opportunity and promote good relations between persons of different racial groups. Through these schemes, public authorities pinpoint how they will both address structural inequalities by eliminating discrimination and promoting equal access while also building tolerance between all groups in society. As part of this, public authorities encourage employment equity and produce Equality Impact Assessments, which assess all policies and strategies to ensure there is not an adverse impact on any racial groups. Gail pointed out the importance of this is that it:

…does mean actually that people have to, people are forced to think about the equalities implications of what they are doing. And part of that…rather than just sitting at a desk and devising a piece of policy just like cold, there is a requirement for someone to consult as part of what you do…so there is a requirement to look at equalities implications as part of what you are doing, in terms of policy development (Gail, GLA).

Although generally accepted by all interview subjects as a major step forward in the equalities field, Gail pointed out inconsistencies in effectiveness of these schemes due to different levels of commitment to implementation and the lack of enforcement mechanisms:
You are required to do one (Race Equality Schemes), but I have always argued that there’s no one actually checking. As good practice, you’ll find everyone has actually got one, but how good they are and how well they are implemented is kind of another matter.

…some people do it without even debate, understand the business case for equalities and they want to do it and they make it the right thing to do. Other people still very much the tick box approach and its those people that we kind of need to, you know, nor force, but people need to understand why they are kind of having to do these things and what are the sort of advantages of doing things this way are (Gail, GLA).

Gail from the GLA believed that the anti-discrimination policies legislated by the Race Relations (Amendment) Act needed to not only to have greater enforcement mechanisms attached to them but also to be applied to the private sector. Several times she commented on this, pointing out that Mayor Livingstone requested this happen but as yet the central government had refused to make this change:

…we do need to do a big piece of work to ensure that for example the private sector who aren’t bound by the same legal requirements in terms of equality legislation as public bodies that they do actually demonstrate that they are actually dealing with equalities in a coherent way. And one of the things he (the mayor) has called for is a change in the law to obviously make the, to put that requirement on the private sector, so they actually do deliver as much as the public sector….we do get lots of representations from Londoners about discrimination they are facing in lots of different sectors, both in the public and private sector but obviously the private sector is much, much worse, because at least in terms of the public sector there is a legal requirement to do something (Gail, GLA).

…there is a recognition as well that there are aspects of that law that need to be changed, for example, the issue I raised earlier about the private sector, they are not bound by the legislation in the same way that the public sector are and especially in London where the economy is so vibrant and we rely so much on the private sector to actually support that economy. It is quite difficult to make sure that, you know, we want to make sure that institutional racism doesn’t permeate through the private sector (Gail, GLA).

As part of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act, public bodies must also promote good relations between persons of different racial groups; all levels of government emphasised the importance of the policy of community cohesion as a means of fostering integration. This policy aims to bring communities together to build a better understanding of the different needs and
aspirations of groups and build bridges and relationships between them to prevent ethnic ghettoisation and intercommunity conflict. Particularly in light of the London bombings, Gail commented on the importance of ensuring “that there isn’t this disbursal, this fracturing of the communities, which obviously could happen so easily as a result of those sorts of things” (Gail, GLA).

A large part of this work has included building the capacity of communities to work with one another, through funding programmes, creating forums for discussion and encouraging outreach and coalitions between different groups within local communities. Although the lower levels of government implement these policies, in particular at the local authority level, it is the central government, in particular the Department for Communities and Local Government, that is the main driver behind the policy.

In the interviews at the local levels of government, this capacity building and community building was emphasised as important and overall perceived positively. At the regional level, Gail from the GLA, although supportive of capacity building and bridge building between communities, questioned the central government’s overall emphasis on ‘integration’, and argued that they could do far more in making sure this is achieved equitably:

They talk about integration a lot and they talk about community cohesion a lot, and you know, we just need to be clear what we actually mean by those things…what I am trying to say is communities integrate as far as they are able to but I still think there is some way to go in terms of policy and legislation to kind of make sure that happens properly (Gail, GLA).

Robert, from the Commission on Integration and Social Cohesion, also questioned the central government’s commitment to creating cohesion, commenting on the at times inflammatory rhetoric coming from the central government that seems to promote something very different from intercultural cohesion and integration:
I think you have seen forms of policy intervention that deliberately and/or accidentally have been more pernicious, in some of the race relations and asylum migration laws have been in presentation to the public as much as in their delivery, I think, have been quite divisive, and you’ve had forms of policy connected to the response of both 9/11 and 7/7 that have also been problematic in various ways (Robert, Commission on Integration and Cohesion).

One way in which the central government has been perceived as successfully tackling issues of exclusion and discrimination is through the increased funding of services, in particular health and education. The comments below highlight the benefits of this:

…the life chances of all people have been improved under New Labour (Grant, Haringey Council).

…the scale of the increase of resources allocated according to need has produced, and I think will produce in the next forty to fifty years a massively beneficial outcome…the situation now means that for every child in the East End of London, which is one of the more broke parts of town… each child will get roughly twice as much in real terms, not just inflation affected terms but in real terms, they will get about twice as much per head spent on them now as they did ten years ago. The impact of that on some of the most disadvantaged communities in Britain I think will be massive (Robert, Commission for Integration and Social Cohesion).

In Canada, there is also interest in dealing with issues of discrimination and the exclusion resulting from this. In the interviews with the senior levels of government, the emphasis was placed on removing barriers to participation, Scott mentioning Canada’s Action Plan Against Racism, which is a government-wide effort to combat racism and remove barriers to participation faced by ethnoracial groups. As already discussed, the senior levels of government in Canada seem concerned over problems of economic integration of skilled migrants, a neoliberal concern about economic productivity of migrants appearing both in the document produced by Heritage Canada to describe this policy and the emphasis by Julie on economic issues in her discussion about policies dealing with issues of institutional racism:

…everyone is valued and respected for who they are - that is the Canadian approach to diversity and multiculturalism. Indeed, it serves Canada well - helping to build a more
resilient, harmonious, and creative society. The country's ongoing success and its prospects for the future hinge on being able to bring together people of all backgrounds - ethnic, racial, and religious - to build a society where no one's identity or cultural heritage is compromised (Canadian Heritage, 2005).

…the Ontario government has created under the liberal government, a Fairness Commissioner for new immigrants that come here and are not able to get positions in their field, an oversight body, so I think that’s a step in the right direction. I think, it’s trying to address this bigger issue of foreign-trained professionals that are here, that are not able to access their fields because of regulatory bodies, but definitely and many of them feel the recognition of international experience has not been recognized (Julie, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade).

Unlike interview subjects at the senior levels of government that concentrated mainly on economic integration, those at the municipal level of government named a number of policies for both dealing with issues of discrimination and promoting tolerance and integration. Similar to the situation in Britain, the municipal government is keen to promote intercultural connections, by bringing different groups together. This is due in part to the concerns that increasing concentrations and increasing numbers of ethnocultural groups meant that if they did not respond by building intercommunity cooperation “you might find a tendency towards increasing social ghettoisation” (Rathika, City of Toronto). Through grants, the City of Toronto gives the community themselves some of the resources and encourages them to implement outreach and cooperative programmes to build these relationships. Rathika emphasised the importance of this, as “it has more meaning…when it is community organised as opposed to government organised” (Rathika, City of Toronto).

The city government also implemented a number of policies to help eliminate racism from within its institutions and make themselves more accessible to ethnoracial groups. These include the Plan of Action for the Elimination of Racism and Discrimination, a multilingual policy, human rights and harassment policy and an employment equity policy. Divisions of the
city government are required to create Action Plans on Equity that are submitted for review by the city council and recently they developed an Equity Lens, which similar to the Equality Impact Assessments in Britain, evaluates the impact of policies and programmes on ethnoracial communities. The success of their employment equity programme in making sure their workforce represents the local population was emphasised by John:

…if you look at the city’s workforce in the upper management and the front line services we are very diverse, in the middle management we have to do a better job but that’s also extremely important in fighting racism to have the public institutions, like the police for example, reflect the community. And in the police, 44% of the last graduating class of Toronto police officers were visible minorities and women …And we have the first black deputy chief of police in the history of this country, who we appointed a year or two ago, in the history of this country, not just Toronto (John, City of Toronto).

Both John and Rathika pointed out that the problems of ethnoracial discrimination institutionalised within state institutions in Canada resulted from policies from senior levels of government, in particular policies of the provincial government. Rathika was particularly scathing of the policies of the Conservative government of the late 1990s, commenting:

…when the Conservatives took office they proceeded to eliminate the employment equity legislation, the race relations units and the programmes, the way in which they funded schools and the way in which they funded schools meant that many of the support services around school community advisers, interpretation, settlement, the other kinds of programmes, social workers, the kind of supports that you actually need to make schools successful for immigrant children. So in one fell swoop they managed to wipe all of that out (Rathika, City of Toronto).

The current Liberal government, although “more responsive” than the Conservatives, has not shown any signs of changing the legislation back to what it was, “so they are tinkering around the edges of it as opposed to making some of the fundamental changes but I don’t know if they will ever do that” (Rathika, City of Toronto).
The changes made to the funding of the cities and the downloading of extra services on the cities particularly affected ethnoracial groups in Toronto. This is made clear by comments from both John and Rathika:

The feds and the province downloaded a lot of capital expenses to the city so that the racism and the changes and the ability to respond was sort of institutionalised in other kinds of ways, and it is partly institutionalised through the way in which the funding of municipal services take place. Because it is not a direct route, where we say therefore we are going to do this. It has to do with the value people have around what they think the role of government responding to social issues and being leaders, the leader, advocacy role as opposed to we are going to do the minimum (Rathika, City of Toronto).

I think that when public services are cut they have a differential impact on equity seeking groups, like racialised groups. So public libraries are a great place to nurture and support interculturalism, to the extent that the city has significant financial challenges and therefore it’s a struggle for us to support the libraries we have, let alone open new ones, it means it is very difficult, it means there’s a loss in the support for interculturalism and in the mutual understanding. The same with recreation programmes and arts and culture. So we all face a challenge that there’s, at some levels of government, there are neo-conservative governments in power that spread a message that taxes are bad as opposed to taxes support public services, that supports all of us. I think that has a bigger impact on diverse communities and on newcomer communities and we need together to fight to ensure that those services are properly funded (John, City of Toronto).

The interviews suggest a preoccupation, in both countries, with tackling issues of institutional racism, with making their institutions reflect the populations they serve and bringing communities together. They also suggest that the priority given to dealing with these issues is not consistent across the different parts of the governments in these two countries. In Britain, although all public authorities are mandated under the Race Relations (Amendment) Act to deal with these issues, the lack of enforcement and the different levels of commitment by different authorities mean differing outcomes across the country. In Canada, the different priorities of each level of government influenced their commitments to anti-racism. In these interviews, the lower levels of government, who have greater interaction with the day-to-day lives of people, showed a greater concern and understanding of the issues of discrimination and exclusion than
the senior levels of government, who were predominantly concerned with issues of economic integration.
Discussion

Nations are sociohistorical constructions created out of “imagined communities”; these communities are continually in the process of creation. As Hage (1996) points out, nations “like any social reality, never reach a state where they just ‘exist’; they are not only constructions, but also continually in the making” (1996; p465). The desire of the nation builders to live in a better nation, however they happen to perceive it, guides this process of nation building. Hage and Anthias & Yuval-Davis (1993) argue that the dominant ethnic group in the nation, the “national aristocracy”, uses the state and civil society in building the nation to impose on others specific values, a specific national identity and a specific national order in which they have the dominant position and the ‘others’ know their place. By using the processes of domestication or extermination, the national aristocracy eradicates the ability of the ‘others’ within the nation to form a counter-will that would threaten or change that national status quo.

In Britain and Canada, the “national aristocracy”, the nation builders, are the white Anglo majority. In the process of building their nations, the national aristocracies in both countries necessarily include the reality of the ethnoracial groups living within their borders; to exclude them totally would nullify the liberal democratic values both nations hold dear to their self-perceptions. Yet despite this commitment to liberal democratic values, instances of discrimination that marginalise ethnoracial groups are pervasive in both nation-states. Henry & Tator (2006) use the term “democratic racism” to describe the situation whereby a nation maintains the contradiction between the “core values” of democratic liberalism and the practices, attitudes and behaviours that maintain discrimination against ethnoracial groups. Despite some differences in the specifics of how this conflict plays out in each of these nations, it appears that both Britain and Canada maintain a form of democratic racism.
In both nations, the importance of “core values” such as a commitment to human rights and democracy were emphasised as a fundamental part of what it means to be British or Canadian. To then totally ignore the diverse ethnocultural reality of the nation-state and do nothing to alleviate the most obvious forms of discrimination would directly contradict these values and call into question the self-imagined identity. Both nations therefore have redefined themselves in a more inclusive manner, both claiming to be multicultural nations, with their ethnoracial diversity seen as a core part of the national identity, particularly in Canada. They have also formulated many similar anti-discrimination policies, in particular focusing on the concept of institutional racism that became such a hot button topic following the 1999 publication of the Macpherson Report in Britain.

As Henry and Tator point out, in democratically racist states it is both possible to espouse these values while continuing the practices that maintain discrimination and marginalisation of ethnoracial groups. Indeed, this discrimination remains a persistent problem in both nation-states, a fact recognised to a greater or lesser degree by interview participants from all levels of government in both countries. Ethnoracial groups are not equally distributed either spatially in the nation-state or in the socioeconomic class structure. Predominantly ethnoracial groups cluster together in urban settings, rural areas remaining white heartlands. Socially and economically, ethnoracial groups remain marginalised, facing difficulties accessing work, adequate housing and health care. All these issues were recognised as serious problems facing ethnoracial groups by interview participants in both countries. As Omidvar and Richmond (2005) and Saloojee (2003) point out, this lack of full access to the social, economic, political and cultural systems that determine the social integration of a person in society leads to social exclusion and a denial of their civil, political and social rights of citizenship.
The fundamental problem for democratically racist states in dealing with issues of discrimination is that policies necessary to ameliorate the low status of ethnoracial groups, such as state mandated changes to the existing social, economic and political order, are perceived as in conflict with and a threat to liberal democracy. Therefore, the spread of racism is dealt with by leaving the basic economic structures and societal relations essentially unchanged. Any efforts to combat racism that require state intervention to change the cultural, social or economic order lacking political support (Henry & Tator, 2006).

The interviews suggested that, although government implemented policies to promote community cohesion and tackle certain issues of discrimination, it did not attempt to fundamentally change the political, social or economic structure of society. The unwillingness to make a fundamental change to the economic order is suggested by the refusal of the central government in Britain to consider Mayor Livingstone’s call to apply the Race Relations (Amendment) Act to the private sector, which currently employs far greater numbers of people than the public sector. Gail commented that even within the public sector, the central government does not enforce the measures mandated under the Race Relations (Amendment) Act, meaning that it is inconsistently applied. This means that some public authorities do attempt to break down barriers to social and political participation by ethnoracial groups, improving access and participation within their institutions, while other authorities do little more than take what Gail referred to as the “tick box approach” of playing lip service to anti-discrimination. Therefore, it appears that little really has changed; these institutions remaining as white monoliths.

Within Canada, Henry & Tator (2006) and Li (2003) argue that none of the current anti-discrimination measures, such as the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Human Rights
Codes, are effective as the means of social change. At least in part, this results from the systemic racism underpinning the Canadian state, the legacy of racism so interwoven into the national culture, public discourse and commonsense ideology that these measures are rendered ineffective in the ways they are interpreted and implemented. These also remain passive measures, preventing certain actions by the state but not requiring it to actively design and implement anti-racist policy and promote social inclusion.

In discussions with government officials, the junior member of government, the municipality, appeared the most proactive in making institutional change, attempting to break down barriers to political and social participation by ethnoracial groups. However, this is only one municipality, Toronto, and one that deals daily with the implications of a very diverse society. The provincial government not only made little attempt to intervene in creating a more equitable social order but has also come under criticism from the interview subjects at the municipality for further institutionalising racism. In particular, it is criticised for repealing anti-racist measures, such as the Employment Equity Act, and introducing funding cuts that predominantly affect ethnoracial groups, both in the school system and through the provision of public services, generally making it harder for cities like Toronto to respond to the needs of their diverse communities.

Indeed the emphasis at both the provincial and federal levels of government appears to be on maintaining the status quo, predominantly concentrating on removing barriers to economic participation, giving ethnoracial groups the opportunity to become productive members of society and providing labour for big business. The neoliberal agenda at the heart of the Canadian state is made apparent by the comment by Julie, that a skilled migrant “even if they are not finding a position in their field they are still finding employment”. This suggests the state’s
concerned is that migrants are economically productive, even if it is not in their area of training. Like in Britain, the state remains unwilling to force equalities and anti-discrimination measures on the private sector, instead implementing measures, such as the creation of a Fairness Commission that in reality does little to fundamentally change the economic and social system.

Multiculturalism, like some of the anti-discrimination measures mentioned above, is increasingly discredited among anti-racists as a means of making fundamental social change. Instead, the suggestion is that state-funded multiculturalism is the means by which the state manages diversity, keeping the ethnic minorities in their place and maintaining the dominant white hegemony (Henry & Tator, 2006; Sivanandan, 2006; Li, 2003; Kallen, 1982), fitting in with Hage’s (1996) analysis of the domestication of the ‘other’. He argues that in nation building, the national aristocracy domesticates the ‘other’, so removing its ability to form a counter-will. In fostering a festive aura of imagined consensus, focusing on “saris, samosas and steel bands”, the state diffuses the three R’s of resistance, rebellion and rejection (Henry & Tator, 2006, p288).

Hage (1996) suggests that part of the domestication of the ‘other’ within the nation-state is its valorisation, moulding and shaping it to provide an economic or social benefit to the dominant group. Bolaria and Li (1988) suggest that it is this valorisation of ethnoracial immigrant groups in state policy that provides capital with an oppressed racialised underclass, so generating low-cost labour tied to undesirable jobs, and promoting the long-term profitability of the Canadian economy, so benefiting all members of the dominant class. In Canada, Teelucksingh and Galabuzi (2005) provide ample evidence of the creation of a racialised section of the working class, ghettoised into certain sectors characterised by low pay and unsavoury working conditions. In Britain, the new racialised workforce is white, the process of
racialisation based on their immigrant and socioeconomic status as well as their Eastern European ethnicity. These new migrants from the EU accession countries fill the economic void previously filled by black immigrants from the New Commonwealth. As Robert from the Commission on Integration and Cohesion made clear, these new white immigrants face an equally hostile population and environment to that which met the primarily Caribbean and Asian migrants in the 1950s and 1960s. In both cases, although their labour was welcomed, their continued presence and demands on inclusion in the nation continue to face hostility. However, it should be noted that because these migrants are not visibly distinct, over time they will face less issues with integrating into the mainstream society, as has been seen in the past in both Britain and Canada with Irish and Italian immigrants (Henry & Tator, 2006).

The valorisation of diversity becomes even more apparent in these nation-states’ attempts to sell themselves in the global market place; again suggesting the importance of the neoliberal philosophy at the heart of both the Canadian and British nation. In both these nations, diversity became a marketing tool to allow each of the main economic hubs to promote themselves as a “world city” with the resources and advantages this provides to global business potentially looking for a location in which to relocate or conduct business. Cities, such as London and Toronto, are marketed as places vibrant with “ethnic colour” that brings a cultural “richness” to the core culture, as well as containing the skills, knowledge base and contacts useful for commerce in the global marketplace. As Abu-Laban and Gabriel (2002) make clear, this multicultural diversity is the new form of nation building, the means by which the nation enhances its global competitiveness.

Where Britain and Canada differ is in the emphasis placed on this, Canada appearing to show a clearer understanding and a greater willingness to attach economic value to diversity and
immigration. Smith’s (1993) analysis points out that since the 1960s, Canada’s immigration and nation building policies have been based on selecting immigrants for their capital and entrepreneurial skill regardless of racial background. This is a self-imagined identity based on that of a settler nation, “a nation of immigrants”. In Britain on the other hand, the focus remained on control and exclusion of immigrations, reflecting their self-imagined identity as an “island nation”. While this analysis is dated, Britain increasingly recognising the importance of immigration to the economy, there remains a seed of truth in this. Canada does actively promote itself as “a nation of immigrants”, this term actually used by John from the City of Toronto during our discussion, and encourages economic migration, while in Britain, there remains an essential unwillingness to open the debate on immigration. This is due in a large part to an entrenched hostility to immigration among the majority (white Anglo) population and media (Shukra et al, 2004; Back et al, 2002). In part at least, this is due to the imperial legacy, Gilroy (2005) suggesting Britain is unable and unwilling to let go of its racially exclusive nationalism, still haunted by the ghosts of imperial greatness.

When the ‘other’ within the nation-state resists the processes of domestication and valorisation, becoming a counter-will to the dominant group, Hage (1996) suggests the state turns to the processes of extermination. In the case of long-established nation-states like Britain and Canada that are confident in their continued existence, this extermination is more likely to take a symbolic rather than a physical form, taking the form of demonisation and exclusion rather than actual practices of ethnic cleansing.

The current use of the process of extermination is apparent in the current War on Terror waged by a number of western democracies, including Britain and Canada. In this, the new enemy aliens are the Muslim population, essentialised as a monolithic community composed of
undesirable and alien ‘others’ that live outside of and are a threat to the “imagined community”, with deviant values and beliefs threatening ‘our’ way of life. This discourse is promulgated through the media and reinforced through the creation of security measures seemingly targeted only at this particular community (Henry & Tator, 2006; Sivanandan, 2006).

In Britain, this process has gone further than in Canada, reflecting the fact of an actual physical assault on the nation-state. Following the 2001 ‘race riots’ and the terrorist attacks on the US, the preoccupation of the state turned from celebrating multicultural diversity (the valorisation and domestication of otherness) to problematising and criminalising Asian youth and promoting assimilationist policies (Sivanandan 2006; Abbas, 2005; Burnett, 2004, Back et al, 2002). In both these ways, the British government engages in fatherland policies. In reasserting a core British identity through citizenship and language policies, the state engages in national self-constitution, little debate allowed on how the nation is defined. Through the process of demonising Asian youth as dangerous, unassimilated others, with potential loyalties beyond the British state to a worldwide Islamic network, they are symbolically excluded from the nation.
Conclusion

Britain and Canada therefore appear to share a number of fundamental similarities in how they have responded to the reality of multicultural diversity within their borders and how they have framed their nation building projects. Fundamentally, both nations retain their white Anglo hegemony, control over the political, economic and social mechanisms of the state remaining in the hands of this cultural group. Therefore, the white dominant group controls the ability of ethnoracial groups to become part of these nations, as they continue to control the state and civil apparatus that grants or withholds access to the social and economic institutions of the nation-state, as well as controlling the means by which the community of the nation imagines itself.

Despite the fact that the nation in both these countries remains predominantly white, with ethnoracial groups confined to the margins of the nation, there is hope for the future. In particular this can be seen in the major cities, such as Toronto and London, where people do mainly live together harmoniously, where multiculturalism as the lived reality of daily life is very apparent. In this way, ethnoracial groups are becoming part of the national landscape, visible on the streets, their cultures celebrated, recognised by their neighbours as fellow British or Canadians and local governments in a sense forced to acknowledge their needs because of the sheer numbers present. As became clear during the interviews, it is those levels of government that have the greatest contact with ethnoracial groups that are making the greatest attempts to be responsive and increase their accessibility. It can only be hoped that over time this lived reality of multiculturalism in the major cities does revivify the ways in which people think about what it is to be British or Canadian.
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**Interviews**

**Britain:**

Diane, (pseudonym). Interview with author, 18 July 2007, Birmingham, UK.


**Canada:**


John, (pseudonym). Interview with author, 3 December 2007, Toronto, Canada.


Stuart, (pseudonym). Interview with author, 10 July 2007, Ottawa, Canada.
Appendix I

Interview Guide

1. How do you see multiculturalism working in Ontario/Toronto/London/Birmingham specifically and Canada/Britain generally?

2. (a) What do you perceive are the positive and negative impact of the demographic changes that have occurred in Canada/Britain?

   (b) What does multiculturalism mean to Canada/Britain in terms of globalisation?

3. Do you see multiculturalism as having regional differences?

4. How do you see the future of Canada/Britain?

5. How would you define Canadianness/Britishness? How does this relate to ethnoracial diversity?

6. What policies have been implemented to help eradicate institutional racism?

7. What do you think are the key issues faced by Canada/Britain’s ethnoracial communities?

8. What policies/strategies is the government following to deal with these issues?

9. What does Canadian/British citizenship mean for ethnoracial communities?
Appendix II

Government Structure in Britain and Canada

Canada

Federal Government
Government of Canada
Parliament in Ottawa

Provincial Government
10 provinces and 3 territories

Municipal Government
Mayor, council and city government

Britain

Central Government
British Government (also English Government)
Parliament in Westminster

Devolved power – Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
Scottish Parliament & Scottish government
National Assembly for Wales & Welsh Assembly government
Northern Ireland Assembly & Executive

Regional Government – England
9 regions
Greater London
Authority only one with devolved powers

Local Government
London Borough Councils
Unitary Authorities

Local Government
County Councils

Local Government
District Councils

Local Government
Scotland & Wales

Source: Directgov (n.d), Local Government Association (n.d.)